The ongoing volatility in the Strait of Hormuz remains a critical threat to the global economy and continues to prompt questions about what rules of international law apply to the Strait both now and in the future.
The 14-point memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Iran and the United States, which was agreed mid-June, did not restore the status quo for shipping through the Strait of Hormuz under international law. Instead, more questions were asked than answered as to the future legal regime governing the Strait of Hormuz.
As already observed, Point 6 of the MoU allowed for the free movement of ships for 60 days but left an implication that a toll or other fees may follow.
Ever since Iran first proposed a toll, governments and commentators have condemned this restriction on the freedom of navigation. A suggestion from the Indonesian Minister of Finance that charges could also be imposed on the Malacca Straits was promptly quashed by the Indonesian President and Singapore’s Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Under the law of the sea, there is no legal right for states bordering straits to charge vessels for transiting through a strait. The littoral states are not to impose any conditions that have the practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the right of transit passage. Charging vessels to transit through a strait would clearly impair navigational rights; if a ship refuses to pay and they are denied the right to proceed through the strait, the right of passage is clearly impaired.
There is an option under the UN Convention for the Law of the Sea (Art 43) for user states of a strait and the coastal states to agree on navigational or safety aids or other improvements that will enhance international navigation. So potentially the provision of services that improve or facilitate navigation might be a way to charge fees. But it is a fine line in determining what is a charge that aids international navigation versus a charge that impairs or hampers that navigation.
